at that time could not therefore be starved into submission. On the other hand, in this War the Germans began to realise they could not go on indefinitely unless the blockade were broken. They were already restricted in some essentials like copper, oil and rubber for the Army, and in some of the necessaries, many of the comforts and most of the luxuries of life for soldiers and civilians. Now that, owing to the stupidity of their opponents, the weakest flanks in the defence system of the Central Powers in the East and the South-East had been so strengthened as to give Germany confidence that their military situation was established beyond immediate anxiety, both the military and naval authorities turned their thoughts more and more towards the question of blockade. It was a double problem—first that of breaking their own blockade and then that of reversing the situation by becoming the blockaders instead of the blockaded. Had an immediate military decision been within their reach, they need not have worried about the stranglehold of the British Navy. But the failure of the Marne, of the first battle of Ypres, and lastly and notably the check they had sustained at *endurance* Verdun, had almost convinced their Head-quarters that they could not break through the Allied Front in the West. The equally disastrous and much more sanguinary repulses sustained by the Allied forces in their various efforts to rupture the

German lines—defended as they were by only two men for every three assailants—strengthened that conviction. It was therefore becoming more and more a struggle of endurance. Here the naval clutch of Britain gave the Allies a decided advantage.

The High Command and the Admirals of Germany,